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FORUM

LOSS OF CONTROL ONLANDING: U Z NEED TO CHANGE OUR MINDSET
A SER-LEARNING
PROJECT FOR FLIGHTSAFETY
Ed Randel, Guillaume Le Couteulx, & Jitesh Bahl

ABSTRACT
The accident of FedEx Flight 14 was caused by something that pilots do with alarming frequency, flying an
unstable approach. This is a large problem in general aviation, and after reading this analysis it will be apparent that
the only way to recover fiom an unstable approach is to go around. This analysis begins with a description of loss of
control on landing and shows how common it is. The details of FedEx Flight 14 are then discussed in length, as well
as some of the training and procedures at Federal Express. Then, aviation safety tools, such as the 5-MModel, are
applied to the accident to uncover some of the root causes, as opposed to the apparent causes provided by the NTSB.
Finally, the action that has been taken locally in the Daytona Beach, FL area will be discussed. This action includes
a safety seminar which was held on Embry-Riddle's campus, as well as an article that was published in the campus
newspaper.
INTRODUCTION
The pilots of FedEx Flight 14, which crashed at Newark
international Airport on July 31, 1997, succumbed to
something that many pilots do on a daily basis, shooting an
unstable approach. Every pilot has shot an unstable
approach at some point in their time flying, but it does not
always end up causing an accident. Many times during
training a pilot will initiate a go-around, a maneuver in
which he or she adds power and climbs out to try the
approach again, but too often the person does not realize
why they should do it. The most important thing for a
student, or any pilot for that matter, to know is why there
was a need for a go-around. If the Captain of FedEx 14 had
been able to recognize that his approach had become
unstable, this accident could have been avoided. Obviously
there were many other factors that were associated with this
accident that will be discussed in this analysis, but that fact
still holds true.
This analysis of the FedEx Flight 14 accident will
discuss the topic of loss of control on landing, explain how
commonplace it is today and why it is an important issue to
try to correct. Following that will be an overview of the
accident, includingthe official cause stated by the NTSB, as
well as what was determined to be the root causes. The data
and information gathered fiom the official accident report
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will then be related to the topic of loss of control on landing.
After providing a thorough explanation of the accident and
its root causes, the action that this team has taken locally to
help mitigate loss of control on landing accidents will be
discussed as an example of student service-learning tied to
an academic course. After that is a discussion of some
common aviation safety tools and how they can be
implemented while researching accidents such as FedEx
Flight 14. Finally, a discussion ensues on what can be done
by safety activists all around the country to help prevent
accidents involving loss of control on landing h m
occurring will be portrayed.
LOSS OF CONTROL ON LANDING
Many people are aware of the saying "landings are where
pilots earn their money", and some pilots may have even
been told this. This saying makes sense because when an
average person goes flying, it is common for them to base
their pilots' skill level mainly on the landing. Who has not
been on a commercial flight where somebody has cracked
a joke about getting the 'hew guy" because the landing was
not as smooth as others they have had before? As it pertains
to the aviation industry, mainly pilots, this saying holds true
as well because of how much can go wrong while the
aircraft is close to the ground. For this reason, it is very
important for a pilot to understand the factors that will lead
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to a stabilized approach and safe landing. FedEx Flight 14,
which crashed at Newark International Airport on July 3 1,
1997, demonstrated what can happen when an aircraft does
not make a stabilized approach to the runway. The details of
the accident will be discussed in detail in the next section,
but it is necessary to mention that it is classified as a loss of
control on landing accident.
The easiest way to define many things is to break them
up into smaller parts, which is how loss of control on
landing will be discussed. The titst part of the phrase, ''Loss
of control...," can be defined as any time that the pilot's
control inputs, desired aircraft reaction, and the actual
aircraft reaction are not in sync with one another. This can
hold true for both over-controllii as was the case in the
FedEx Flight 14 accident, as well as under-controlling the
aircraft. Over-controlof the aircraft is more commonly seen,
which generally leads to a condition called Pilot Induced
Oscillation (PIO), which is when a pilot tries to correct for
their previous input with a larger input in the opposite
direction. The aircraft then continues to diverge from the
desired flight path until it cannot be controlled.
The second half of the phrase, "...on landing," can
be more misleading then it may appear at first glance. This
does not only pertain to the act of landing the aircraft on the
runway sudke, but begins well before a flight ever gets to
the landing phase. The first thing that can factor into the
landing is the quality of the approach brief&. Approach
briefings should include enough information so the pilot, or

crew in larger operations, has a clear picture of the airport,
its surroundings, and what procedures will be used for the
approach and landing. If any part of this is not clear, it can
lead to an unstabilized approach. The next phase of flight
that factors into the landing is the approach to the runway,
which must be stabilized by an altitude set forth by the
specificoperator. An appropriatealtitudeto be stabilized by
for general aviation air& is SO0 feet. What does it mean
to be stabilized?The Flight Safety Foundation statesthat for
an approachto be stabilized, the aircraft must be: configured
for landing, on glide slope, within a specific tolerance of the
approach speed, able to continue to the runway wit!
minimal pitch and power adjustments, and have a minimal
sink rate (Stabilized Approach, 2000). After completing a
comprehensive briefing and flyinga stabilizedapproach,the
pilot is more adequately prepared to safely and skillhlly
land the aircraft.
Although the approach and landing only accounts
for a small percentage of the total flight time, a large
number of accidents occur during this time. A study was
completed for the time period between 1984 and 1997 and
it was determined that out of 76 loss of control on landing
accidents, 66 percent of them were caused by unstable
approaches (Stabilized Approach, 2000). Figure 1 is a chart
published by the Flight Safety Foundation that shows the
leading causes of landing accidents. Unfortunately this type
of accident is much more prevalent then is desired and can
involve pilots of any skill level.

Landina
" Gear Malfunction
5.6% Aircraft Configuration
Surface Conditions
I

Figure 1. Leadiig Landing Accident Causes (Stabilized Approach, 2000).

-
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The next section of this analysis will summarizethe flight as
well as a discussion of the flight characteristics. It is
important to keep in mind all of the factors associated with
loss of control on landing and how it can be avoided.
SUMMARY OF IXIGHT
On July 31" 1997, at Newark International Airport,
approximately 0132 eastern daylight time, Federal Express
Flight 14 crashed while attempting to land on Runway 22R,
which has a length of 8,200 feet. Five occupants were on
board and only minor injuries were received. Their flight
began in Singapore on July 30m, 1997 and was due to
terminate at Newark InternationalAirport on July 3 I\ with
stops in Penang, Malaysia; Taipei, Taiwan; and Anchorage,
Alaska.
Onboard were the Captain and First Officer, two cabin
passengers, and one jump seat passenger. The Captain and
First Ofl5cer had taken over the final leg of the flight, from
Anchorage to Newark. All of the previous landings at the
scheduled stops were performed safely. According to the
flight plan, the aircraft flew at 33,000 feet, FL 330, with an
estimated time enroute of 5 hours and 51 minutes from
Anchorage to Newark. It was also noted that the aircraft's
No.1 thrust reverser, located on the left engine, was
inoperative and that the crew was aware of it.
At Newark, visual meteorological condition prevailed
with winds b m 240" at 10 knots, 10 statue miles of
visibility and clouds scattered at 8000 feet. As the aircraft
approached final, the Captain, who was flying, disengaged
the autopilot and flew the a h a f t to touchdown. As he
flared the aircraft for touchdown, he lost control of the
aircraft suddenly, and impacted the runway, went airborne,
and then touched down for the second time with extreme
force, followed by the collapse of the right main landing
gear. The aircraft came to a rest with the fuselage inverted,
and parts scattered on and to the right of the runway.
What happened in this accident? Was this simply flight
crew error, or was there more behind the accident?
Throughout the following section, the pilot's personal
information, the a i r d and crew's performance during the
approach and landing sequence,the Federal Expresstrainiig
program and finally the cause of the accident, shall be
discussed.
Crew Flight History
The 46 year old captain was hired by the Flying Tigers in
1979, and became a FedEx pilot in 1989. He held an airline
transport pilot (ATP) certificate as well as a type rating in
the MD- 11. He received his FAA k t class medical
certificate on April 15", 1997 and was issued a limitationto
wear corrective lenses. His last proficiency check and line
check before the accident were on April 15", 1997 and July

1I", 1997 respectively. The captain had a total of 11,000
hours; 2,62 1of which were with Federal Express. He logged
1,253 hours in the MD-11 and had a total of 318 hours as
pilot in command of that aircraft. The records also stated
that he had hiled an upgrade proficiency check ride on
October 29*, 1996, but then passed after receiving
additional training. He also completed the MD-11 Tail
Strike Awareness Training Program twice, once for
recurrent training as a first officer on July lo", 1996and the
second time during his captain upgrade training on
November ISm,1996.
The captain arrived in Anchorage, Alaska the day before
the accident from Nevada and stated that he was in good
health, received adequate rest, and had no signs of fatigue.
He stated that he felt tired at the end of the accident flight
but his performance was not affected.
The 39 year old first officer was hired on September 6",
1994as a ground service employee and was then transferred
to the air operations division in October, 1995. Prior to
starting with the company, he was a pilot in the U.S. Navy
and a flight engineer for another airline. He had logged a
total of 1,911hours of flight time as a pilot and 1,200hours
as a flight engineer. He held both ATP and flight engineer
certificates and was type rated in the MD-11. His last FAA
medical certificate was issued on March 25", 1997 and had
received no limitations. His latestproficiency check and line
check were on May 18" 1997 and June 28", 1997.
Prior to the accident, he had logged 3,703 hours of total
time, 592 of which were with FedEx and 95 hours were on
the MD-11. Records stated that he had also completed the
MD-11 Tail Strike Awareness Training Program on May dm
and lo", 1997. The first officer had been off duty for 2 days
in Anchorage and he stated that he had 8 hours of rest the
day before the accident and did not feel fatigued at any time
during the flight. If it was not crew fatigue, what actually led
to the accident? Next, the aircraft and crew's performance
must be analyzed.
Aircraft & Crew Performance
During the final approach segment, the aircraft was
stabilized for much of the approach to Runway 22R at
Newark. At 1,200 feet the captain disengaged the auto pilot,
left the auto throttles engaged, and hand flew the aircraft to
touchdown. With the auto throttles engaged, the throttlesare
automatically reduced to idle thrust, when the aimaft
descends through 50 feet of altitude. According to the flight
data recorder, the aircraft maintained an airspeed of 158
knots, with flaps set to 50', and the landing gear deployed.
The aircraft had a vertical speed of 800 feet per minute, a 2"
to 3" pitch up attitude, and the throttles set between 55' to
58' thrust resolver angle (TRA). The TRA corresponds to
- -
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the total travel of the throttles, with 4 1'being idle thrust and
85' nearing full thrust.
As the captain initiated the flare at 38 feet, the aircraft's
pitch increased to 4 9 , while the thrust and airspeed
decreased, and the vertical acceleration increased to 1.18
G's. As the aircraft passed through 17 feet, the captain
pitched the nose down causing vertical acceleration to
decrease to 0.93 G's while descending through 7 feet.
Suddenly, the captain increased thrust, pitched the nose up,
applied left rudder deflection along with a right wing down
aileron deflection, and touched down 1,126 feet beyond the

runway threshold. Then the aircrafi went airborne. Half a
second later the captain reduced power and pitched the nose
back down while applying more left rudder and right wing
aileron deflection. The aircraft impacted the runway for the
secondtime 1,889 feet beyond the runway threshold, at 1.70
G's, causing the right main landing gear to collapse.
Following that, the aircraft ruptured; resulting in wreckage
being scattered, 5,126feet beyond the threshold and 580 feet
to the right of the centerline, with the fuselage coming to
rest inverted slightly to the right of the runway.

Figure 2. Aircraft Debris Analysis (NTSB, 2000).
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Despite the instabilityof the final portions of approach, the
crew did not execute a go-around. Before determining the
root causes of this accident, some of the training programs
which the crew had received, specifically for the MD-11,
warrant attention.
FedEx MD-11 Tail Strike Awareness Training
Program
The purpose of this program, which began in June 1996,
was to increase awareness of tail strikes which commonly
occur on the MD-11, as well as to show how to prevent
them. The program focuses on how to maintain a proper
sink rate, recover fiom a bounce, and other low level ground
techniques. This program stated that "25 percent of MD-11
tail strikes to date have occurred on takeoff and 75 percent
on landing." Generally, tail strikes occur on landing when
i%e aircraft's flaps are configured to 35" and 50', but can
idso occur when the center of gravity is either too far
f'>rwardor afi, the aircraft is very light or heavy, and by
h,ivingover serviced struts. The instructor's guide for this
piogram states that if an unstable approach or bounce
occurs, a go-around should be initiated. Pilots tend to
attempt to decrease a high sink rate during an approach, by
increasing the pitch attitude. This actually increases the
effective weight of the aircraft and the vertical acceleration,
which will then compress the main gears even m e r , thus
causing the aft fbselage to strike the runway. The program
also notes that pilots should avoid holding the "aircraft off
in an attempt to achieve a smooth landing." Holding the
aircraft off of the runway will result in a longer touchdown,
increase in braking, and a higher pitch attitude which can
cause a tail strike (NTSB,2000).
So how do pilots perform a normal landing in the MD1l ? The procedure states that pilots should aim to touch
down 1,500 feet beyond the runway threshold. At 30 feet of
altitude, pilots should initiate a2.5" flare attitude, which will
transition the aircraft into the landing attitude. By this time,
the aircraft will be below 10 feet and the pilot should
maintain a constant attitude by releasing some of the
elevator back pressure. In this accident, however, the
Captain did not follow this procedure. Even having taken
the training program, the Captain was still unable to land the
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aircraft safely. In August, 1997, FedEx implemented a 25
minute video to reinforce the tail strike awareness and goaround techniques.
Cause of accident
The NTSB concluded that "the captain's over control of
the elevator during the landing and his failure to execute a
go-around fiom a destabilized flare were causal to the
accident. Contributing to the accident was the captain's
concern with touching down early to ensure adequate
stopping distance." The captain's over control of the aircraft
resulted in a classic case of pilot induced oscillation (PIO).
Inaddition,the captain's landing procedure was inconsistent
with the Federal Express MD-11 training program.
Furthermore, the captain was concerned about the landing
distance on the runway which was calculated by the Airport
Performance Laptop Computer (APLC).The crew did not
recognize the miscalculated stopping distance, causing the
captain to feel the need to touch down earlier on the runway.
\So how could an experienced crew miscalculate the
stopping distance? Analytical tools such as the 5-Mmodel
and the Reason Model can be applied to the accident
information to determine root causes.
FLIGHT SAFETY CONCEPTS
The history of flight safety and accident investigation has
been punctuated by the appearance or the application of
concepts such as the Five-M Model, introduced after World
War I, the Reason Model, which appeared in the 1990's and
also the Seven Human Factors which can affect pilot
performance. Analyzing an accident is directly linked to the
use of those concepts to help investigators and safety
activists better understand an accident and determine all of
the key elements that led to it. The following paragraphs
show how the three previously mentioned concepts can be
applied to the FedEx Flight 14 accident.
The 5-M Model applied to the Fed& Flight 14
accident
The 5-M Model helps to better understand what could
have led to an accident (Wells & Rodrigues, 2003). It is
divided into five parts: Man, Machine, Medium, Mission
and Management, as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. The 5-M Model (Wells & Rodrigues, 2003).

Those five M's, which are linked together, must comprise
all the elements that may be analyzed in order to determine
factors that can be considered causal in the accident.
The first area of the 5-M Model that will be discussed is
Man. In the FedEx Flight 14 accident, the captain's skills
were relevant because he over-controlled the aircraft and
experienced loss of control on landing. Moreover, the loss
of control of the aircraft was induced by other elements such
as the misinterpretation of the information given by the
Airport Performance Laptop Computer (APLC), which led
the crew to believe that Runway 22R was not going to be
long enough. Concerned about the runway length, the
captain wanted to touch down before the aiming points of
the runway, which finally led to the loss of control of the
aircraft.
After looking into %e Man", it is important to look into
the Machine aspect of the 5-M Model. Training sessions
have been set up in the airline industry to help make pilots
aware ofthe undesirable characteristicsoftheMD-11. Some
Page 18

https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol17/iss3/2

of these characteristics include: pitch up attitude when
spoilers deploy at landing, which can lead to tail strikes, and
"relaxed stability" caused by a CG further aft than the other
civilian airplanes (Boser, 2002). All of these elements may
have led the captain of FedEx Flight 14 to over-control the
aircraft. As if those characteristics did not provide enough
issues, on the day of the accident, a thrust reverser was
inoperative. This led to the crew thbkhg that the landing
distance was going to be longer than the one given by the
APLC, but this is not the case because thrust reversers are
not factored into the official landing distance requirement.
MD-lls are also fitted with a F l i t Control Computer
(FCC) which dampers the orders sent to the flight controls.
The intent is to "match the handling characteristics of the
MD- 11 to those of the existing DC- 10 and the DC- 10newly
developedtwo-pilot adaptation,the MD-10" (NTSB,2000).
The FCC design must be analyzed in order to determine the
role it may have played in the accident.
The third area that must be discussed is the Medium,
JAAER, Spring 2008
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which has to do with the role the environment and time
played in the accident. FedEx Flight 14 was due to arrive in
Newark at night and visual meteorological conditions
existed at the time of arrival. Runway 22R at Newark
International Airport, and more importantly, its length,
contributed to the crew being worried about the lading
distance. This factor led to the crew's desire to touchdown
early and contributed to the accident.
Now that the man, machine, and medium have been
discussed, the next area to look at is the mission. As was
discussed earlier, FedEx Flight 14 was set to land inNewark
after departing Singapore a day earlier and making three
stops along the way. The goal of any flight is to safely
execute all aspects of that flight and land safely at the
destination. The crew, after having misinterpreted the
information given by the APLC, decided that the only way
to land safely was to touch down early.
The Final section of the 5-MModel that needs to be
discussed is the management. This section surrounds all of
the other sections of the model and is very useful in wing
to determine root causes. In this case, the training sessions
used by FedEx may have contributed to the accident. The
Crew did not appear to have adequate training using the
APLC. In addition, the Captain and the First Officer both
suffered fiom a lack of knowledge concerningthe regulation

pertainingto landing distance. They thought that the landing
distance was going to be longer than the one given by the
APLC because one thrust reverser was inoperative. In
reality, the decelerationeffects of the thrust reversers are not
taken into account in determining the landing distance.
Furthermore, the crew selected MAX auto brake, which
automatically sets the deceleration rate a t a value
correspondingto the best fiiction coefficient, not depending
on the use of thrust reversers. The possible inadequacies in
training and deficiency in the knowledge of important
Federal Regulations significantly contributed to the
accident.
m e Reason's Model applied to the Fed& Flight 14
A ccIdent
The Reason Model is also known as the Swiss Cheese
Model (Wells and Rodrigues, 2003). Each slice of the
model represents a barrier that can prevent an accident h m
happening. However, each slice is depicted with holes in it
to represent errors or deficienciesin that particular area. For
an accident to occur, those holes must all line up, which is
shown in Figure 4. The first barrier depicted with holes in it
is that of the decisions-makers. As stated before, the crew
suffered fiom a lack of knowledge regarding the regulation
concerning the calculation of landing distance.

Preconditions
Line Management Deficiencies
Decisions Makers

r

Figure 4. The Reason Model (Wells & Rodrigues, 2003).
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An importantquestion to ask when usingthe ReasonsModel
is, what would have happened if FedEx or the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) had required written
proficiency tests conceming commonly used regulations?
When looking at the handling characteristicsof the aircraft,
what would have happened if the regulation concerning the
certification of airplanes had been reviewed in order to
increase the requirements concerning the stability of pitch
movements? If these questions were addressed and action
was taken to adjust current regulations, perhaps this type of
accident could be avoided in the future.
The next barrier is that of line management deficiencies,
which pertains to the problems in the management of the
company. It appeared that the crew suffered fiom
insufficient training concerning landing techniques and the
use of the APLC. The Captain of FedEx 14 did not adhere
to the training proposed by FedEx, which shows a lack of
training regarding adherence to standard operating
procedures.
Preconditionsis the term used to describe the next barrier
that is shown in the Reason Model, which encompasses
ignorance of the system and the acceptance of hazards. The
Crew misinterpretedthe informationgiven by the APLC and
that misinterpretation was partly induced by a lack of
knowledge of the regulation concerning landing distance
calculation. For this reason, the captainthought it was worth
the risk to the safety of the flight to attempt to land prior to
the typical touchdown point.
The fourth barrier, labeled unsafe acts, includes the use
of wrong procedures and unsafe acts. The captain wanted
to touch down early, but did not adhere to any of the
procedures set forth by FedEx regarding landingthe MD-11.
This led to the Pilot Induced Oscillations which finally led
to the loss of control of the aircraft. In addition, the desire to
touch down early altered the approach path of the aircraft
and could have taken them outside of the object fiee area.
Finally, the last barrier to an accident is termed defenses,
which has to do with things such as safety regulations not
being enforced or over-reliance on automation. The NTSB
recommended upgrading the FCC,which highlighted some
deficiencies in its conception, but this was being done
slowly to not interrupt the flight schedules. In addition, the
First Officer should have noticed the Captain's lack of
control of the MD-11 and suggested a go-around.
HUMAN PERFORMANCE IN FEDEX F'LIGHT 14
There are seven factors which can alter the performance
of a crew (Wells and Rodrigues, 2003). The first factor that
&ts human performance is the physical factor, which
includes things such as age, strength and the senses. The
FedEx 14 captain suffered fiom sense and motor skill
Page 20
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deficiencies,leadinghim to overreactand lose control of the
aircraft. Physiological factors take into account things such
as health and nutrition. Even tho*
htigue was not
reported as a factor contributing to the accident, it is
possible that the fatigue caused by a long flight could have
factored into the misinterpretation of the information given
by the APLC and knowledge of the regulation regardingthat
data. Psychological factors include the mental state and
personality traits of the crew. This is important to consider
because perhaps the captain thought he could land the
aircraft without following procedures because he had done
it before. This is known as normalization of deviance, a \
mentality of "it worked before, so it will work now".
The psychosocial factors cover a wide range of effects,
but most important in this case was anxiety and possibly
their families. After a long flight, the will of landing as soon
as possible may have urged the pilots to land even though
the approach was not stabilized. In addition, the crew's
skills may have been affected by the stress caused by the
misinterpretedlanding distance. Hardware factored into the
accident because of the APLC interface and the FCC that
was not upgraded. The APLC interface may have been
deficient, increasing the risk of misinterpretation of the data.
Nature of the task is another factor that must be considered
when studying the accident. The crew was focused on
touching down early and the inoperative thrust reverser was
gaining much of the captain's attention. The captain
reminded the first officer several times to only activate two
thrust reversers. Finally, the environment may have
contributed to the accident because it was nighttime when
they landed at Newark. The darkness may have increased
crew fatigue, which tends to decrease a crew's ability to
function properly and safely.
SERVICE-LEARNING TO PREVENT SIMILAR
ACCIDENTS
As mentioned previously, the FedEx Flight 14 accident
was due in part to the loss of control, more specifically the
over-control of the aircraft, by the captain during landing.
This incidence was neither the first, nor the last time such an
action led to an accident. Aside fiom the statistics given at
the beginning of this report, that idea can be confirmed by
reviewing the database provided by the Air Safety
Foundation (Peterson, 2006). The database provides
information on similar accidents, which will be discussed
below.
On December 21 1992, a Martinair DC-10 crashed at
Faro, Portugal, killing 56 people. The instability of the
approach was reported to be one of the contributing factors
to the accident. One year later, in 1993, severe crosswinds
in Dallas Fort Worth led to the destabilized approach of
JAAER, Spring 2008

8

Randel et al.: Loss of Control on Landing: We Need to Change Our Mindset: A Serv

Loss of Control on Landing

American Airlines Fight 102. When the First Officer
advised the Captain he was going to execute a go-around,
the Captain took control of the DC-10 and decided to
continue the approach and landing. The Captain failed "to
use proper directional control techniques to maintain the
aircraft on the runway" and the aircraft departed the runway
(NTSB, 1994). In 1999, during a major thunderstorm, 3
people were killed when an MD-11 crashed in Hong Kong.
The final report stated that the Captain had failed to "to
arrest the high rate of descent existing at 50 ft Radio
Altitude" (Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, 2004).
In those three cases, and other similar ones, the reports
state loss of control as one of the causes that contributed to
the accident. However, "Loss of Control on Landing" can
be considered an apparent cause and can only be prevented
by trying to fix the root causes which lie behind it. Many
times these accidents are due to a lack of knowledge
concerning unstabilized approaches and the necessity of
going around. As written by Bahl, Le Couteulx and Randel,
"the attitude must change fkom 'we will land unless'. ..,to
a mindset of, 'let's be prepared to go around, and only land
if the approach is stabilized and we can continue safely to
the runway"' (The Avion, 2006). Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University is an excellent place to start
teaching pilots how to recognize an unstabilized approach
and to stress the need to perform a go-around fiom
unstabilized approaches. Increased awareness of what can
lead to the loss of control on landing is, in fact, the best way
to prevent similaraccidents fiom occurring. An article, titled
We Need to Change our Mindset, which is the source of the
previous quote, was published in the Avion on November
14,2006,by the authors ofthis JAAERarticle. Additionally,
a safety seminar titled Keys to Stabilized Approaches and
Sqfe Landings was also organized and presented on

November 27, 2006, at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University. A copy of the article fiom The Avion can be
found in Appendix A. From those two safety actions, the
key sentence to remember with regards to approach and
landings could be: "Whenever you hesitate to go-around, go
around!"
CONCLUSION
The FedEx Flight 14 accident resulted fiom an
attempted landing following an unstable approach. The
captain followed procedure and was flying a stabilized
approach until an altitude of about 50 feet. After passing
through this altitude, the captain controlled the aircraft in
a way that led the aircraft into a pilot induced oscillation.
Despite this, the crew did not execute a go-around, which
is recommended by FedEx training and procedures for an
unstable approach. To try to mitigate this type of accident
in the future, it is important to look past the apparent
cause, pilot error, and to divulge the root causes. Through
the use of aviation safety tools such as the 5-M Model, the
Reason Model, and the Seven Factors Affecting Human
Performance, some of the possible root causes can be
uncovered. The root causes included inadequacies in the
training of the FedEx pilots, a deficiency of knowledge of
pertinent regulations, which could tie into training, and
the outdated Flight Control Computer that should have
been updated prior to the accident.
As was discussed earlier, this type of accident is very
common in general aviation as well, which is why it is
important to recognize an unstable approach and do the
only appropriate thing, GO-AROUND! Hopefully this
analysis has inspired pilots to have the courage to
recognize their mistakes and simply go-around for another
approach when circumstances dictate.

+
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Appendix A
Avion Article
We Need to Change Our Mindset
By: Ed Randel, Guillaume Le Couteulx,
and Jitesh Bahl
As many of you know there has been an abrupt increase in landing incidents here at ERAU. It is very easy to blame the
pilots involved so that we can put distance between ourselves and the incidents. The fact is, however, this can happen to any one
of us if we aren't careful.
The purpose of this article is not to teach you how to land or set up an approach, instead it will hopellly help you
recognize an unstable approach and make you aware of the importance of going around immediately. It also bears mentioning
that every accident is the result of a chain of errors. Human errors are common in any endeavor and sometimes are so small that
they are seen as being insignificant. Other times, several of the seemingly insignificant errors occur simultaneously, stacking up
on each other and producing an accident.
After talking with David Zwegers, Director of Aviation Safety here at ERAU, it was clear that all of the incidents were
set up by an unstable approach. The flight department has taken steps to attempt to help avoid future incidents like the ones we
have recently experienced. An all LP. meeting was called to review the importance of teaching a safe and stabilized landing
approach to their students. Despite this, it is important to remember that all students must accept the responsibility of ensuring
a safe flight.
It is very easy to fall intothe trap of trying to salvagean unstable approach during training because the instructor is there
to tell us to go around if it gets too "bad". This can lead to a pilot who will only go around at the last second or when the words
"go around'' are heard. Below are some tips to help you recognize an unstable approach.
It is recommended by the FAA Safety Foundation that an approach in visual meteorological condition (VMC) be
stabilized by at least 500 feet AGL. A stabilized approach should include these following conditions: 1) the aircraft is on the
correct flight path, 2) only minor adjustments in heading, pitch, and power are needed to maintain that flight path, 3) your airspeed
is stabilizedat approach speed +5/-0 knots, 4) the aircraft is in landing con£iguration, 5 ) the sink (descent) rate is stabilized at no
more than 500 feethin, and 6) all briefings and checklists are complete. These can be summarized by saying that the aircraft
track, flight path angle, and the airspeed must all be in accordance with normal operating procedures. If any one of these are not
met, an immediate go around should be executed.
Some very common situations that occur on unstable approaches include: flying the approach at idle because of excess
speed or altitude, increasingpower on short final to stretch the approach, or very steep approaches requiring a side slip well below
a safe stabilization altitude.
Every,daypilots ignore these signs hoping to salvage a landing and avoid the go around. Most of the time the pilot is
able to salvagethe approach and safely land the airplane, but you cannot allow this normalization of deviance to occur. The h t
time it happens you may only be 50 feet high, but after doing that a few times, 50 feet high becomes the standard approach height.
One example of an attempt to salvage an unstable approach happened just last month in Pensacola, a.
A student pilot,
on his first solo, after one hour of landing practice with his instructor and one successful solo landing, impacted the trees at the
departure end of the runway on his second solo landing attempt. The student was high on the approach and tried to salvage the
approach. When the go around was initiated, it was too late. The pilot could not climb sufficiently, resulting in impacting the
trees, but, luckily, damaging only the aircraft.
An accident such as this, as well as the recent incidents here at ERAU, must lead to a change in mindset among all pilots.
The attitude must change fiom "we will land unless.. ." to a mindset of "let's be prepared to go around, and only land if the
approach is stabilized and we can continue safely to the runway". This change in attitude will not only lead to a decrease in the
number of incidents, but will also improve the quality of landings by all levels of pilots. Thank you for taking the time to read
this article and please continue to fly safely in the future.
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